To understand the alternative definitions of “superior”, “inferior” and “peer”, we will examine two cases of disagreement (Frances 2014). Applied to our framework, the point of view of justification denies independence. In cases where first-rate evidence strongly supports belief in p, this fact can be used to reassess your interlocutor`s epistemic references. Independence has only allowed information “outside” the disagreement to influence the evaluation of peer references, but here the fact that your interlocutor does not agree with something you rightly believe has a reason to ignore his opinion on the subject gives you a reason to ignore. But as seeking that she would, she missed the real question of disagreement. In this section, I will distinguish three types of disagreements: ordinary, extreme, and profound.8 I will argue that the surprise report gives a plausible and satisfactory account of all three. It also provides a satisfactory representation of the epistemic meaning of the agreement. Since deep disagreements are the ones that cause the problem of the absence of a spine, they will receive by far the most attention. These types of disagreements are, of course, ideal types: in the real world, things can be chaotic. However, far from casting doubt on the usefulness of the typology, it makes it possible to predict and understand how it can be disordered. I will argue that different types of disagreements require different types of answers.
I will distinguish three basic types of cases. Disagreements provide information of a particular nature to the extent that they are unexpected, and the species can be distinguished by reference to how the disagreement is unexpected. In ordinary disagreements, the disagreement is unexpected, but not shocking, and we should reconcile by significantly reducing our confidence in the proposal in question (the “target proposal”). In extreme disagreements, disagreement is shocking, and we should reconcile by drastically reducing our confidence that our partisan adversary is an epistemic peer. In the case of deep disagreements, the disagreement is not at all unexpected and gives us no reason to reconcile in terms of the proposed goal or in relation to the peerage of our contestants. Deep disagreements represent pressure, if not to reconcile, at least to examine the principles and assumptions from which we start. Such pressure comes from a source other than the pressure for reconciliation that results from ordinary and extreme disagreements: from the suspicion of irrelevant influences. As one reviewer points out, it is unlikely that all of our deep disagreements stem from differences in the weight we attach to moral foundations. For example, disputes in metaphysics or epistemology can go deep (think of disputes between naturalists and non-naturalists). While I think most of the deep disagreements that raise concerns about the absence of a spine are morally or directly or indirectly related and limited by moral principles, deep disagreements certainly stem from conflicts over other principles or differences in worldview.
In the case of the piano, there is probably nothing important about the question of what to do in case of disagreement. But in many cases, our disagreements are of great importance, both in the public sphere and in our personal lives. You may disagree with your spouse or partner on whether to live together, get married, where to live, or how to raise your children. People who have political power disagree on how to spend huge sums of money, or on which laws to pass or which wars to fight. If only we were better able to resolve our disagreements, we would likely save millions of lives and discourage millions more from living in poverty. Hallsson, B. (2019). The epistemic meaning of political disagreements.
Philosophische Studien, 176, 2187-2202. Before concluding this section, it is worth stopping to see how the surprise report (as I now call it) deals with the corresponding cases. Several philosophers (e.B Matheson 2015) have pointed out that the agreement can also provide a reason to update the faith. How can this be on the account offered here? Finally, if I believe p, then a peer`s approval of me is exactly what I expect, and therefore gives me no reason to update. Again, however, the account gets the right result: the deal gives me a reason to update only to the extent that it`s unexpected. Consider Restaurant Check. Anika believes that the right result is $43, and because she believes bindi is reliable, she believes bindi will agree. But she is not very confident that Bindi will agree (mental arithmetic, after all, is not a very reliable method). Since she is only reasonably confident that Bindi will agree, her actual agreement provides Anika with information in light of which she should reinforce her confidence that the answer is $43. The more certain he is of both the other agent`s response and his peerage, the less unexpected the consent will be and, therefore, it should have less impact on his trust. Harry`s (counterfactual) agreement with Jennifer that 2+2=4 should not increase Jennifer`s confidence in the proposal to a noticeable degree. The agreement provides evidence of belief in goals in the very situations where a disagreement would provide evidence against the goal statement (and not against the competence or sincerity of the other person): if we are not so confident to believe that the disagreements would not change us.
If we are so confident, an agreement is fully expected. In these cases, the disagreement is shocking and gives us a reason to doubt the sincerity or competence of the dissident instead of reconciling on the proposed goal. Matheson, J. (2015). The epistemic meaning of disagreements. ==References=====External links===However, the link between controversy and skepticism will not apply to many of our other beliefs. No one (or someone you know) walks around saying that your parents don`t like you, that you`re not a fundamentally moral person, etc. So these beliefs are probably immune to any skeptical arguments of the form “There have long been disagreements among experts about your faith (B); You know everything about it (i.e. conditions (i) – (viii)); You have no good reason to dismiss those who disagree with you; So you shouldn`t keep your belief (B)`. This is not to say that these beliefs escape all skeptical arguments based on human error and related phenomena.
But the first thing to note about skepticism about disagreement is that it is contained. Only beliefs that meet something like the conditions for recognition of controversy are subject to this skeptical threat. Interestingly, however, he himself is not exempt from these skeptical consequences. Such views on disagreement are themselves highly controversial, so here too there is another place where the concern for self-destruction arises. The problem of peer disagreements in epistemology discusses how a person should react when they learn that someone else with the same knowledge disagrees with them. [1] Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: the good news. Philosophical Review, 116, 187-218. The second way in which my report differs from Vavova`s is more significant. While distinguishing irrelevant influence from disagreement, noting that not all cases of disagreement concern the former, he argues that evidence of irrelevant influence is of the same kind as evidence of disagreement, and that the present case is an error. I have suggested that deep disagreements are related to irrelevant influences and that this is not evidence of error.
At first glance, the difference may seem only terminological: Vavova uses “error” to encompass all the factors that lead to incorrect conclusions, including those typically questioned in irrelevant cases of influence (such as bias and vaccination (2018: 141)), while I use “errors” more closely to spot errors that can be quickly corrected based on new information (using our trust). to be reduced either to the contested belief or to the belief that an agent is a peer; of course, such a correction is only a first reaction, but it counts as a true correction in that it restores the coherence of our beliefs). But the dispute is more than just terminology. Advocates of these conciliatory views have reacted in different ways. First, some point out that the way these views are self-destructive is not a way to show that these views are false or incapable of being true. “No true sentence has more than 5 words” can also be called self-destructive, but this is another type of defeat. At worst, the consequence of accommodating opinions is that they cannot reasonably be believed in certain circumstances, but such an inability to be reasonably believed does not prove their lie. Moreover, a skeptical attitude toward the epistemic meaning of disagreement seems to fit quite well with the spirit of these views (more on this below). Epistemologists distinguish two types of disagreements.
One of them is that of disagreements over the facts. For example, a disagreement over whether the earth is spherical or flat. The second type of disagreement concerns a proposed course of action, for example, whether to travel to Italy or Greece. [2] From the point of view of good reasons, equal weight must be given to the two elements of higher order (ii) and (iii). .